The initial essay, by Berrios and Markova, introduces the concept of the self and its contentious history. This essay is unique because it shifts our awareness from a familiar and personal perspective of the self to a less recognizable form by historical means. The authors' conclusion is provocative, suggesting that the notion of the self is linguistic, "not like stones, horses and weeds," and therefore will elude efforts to pin it down either structurally or functionally. The rest of the book appears to be an effort to demonstrate the contrary.
By design, the book unfolds with single strands emanating from different positions. In a positive light, one gets a sense of the complexity of this inquiry, with interesting viewpoints and models advanced. In the first section, Northoff and Heinzel underline the perspectives of neuroscience, psychiatry, and philosophy. They suggest that no particular outlook enjoys a privileged relation with the truth and that examining the claims and weaknesses from each viewpoint will add to an overall understanding. They maintain that different levels of analysis (first-, second-, or third-person) focus on distinctive aspects of the self.
In the second section, O'Brien and Opie focus specifically on schizophrenia and the challenge of this disorder to philosophy, specifically to the theory of "unity of consciousness." Both papers are speculative and touch on some problematic aspects. Kircher and David take the position that schizophrenia represents "a disentanglement of the normal unity of body, thoughts and emotions," p 3 which allows the "mental architecture" of the self to be exposed. At the book's outset, Kircher and David understand the self in materialistic terms, that is, a view of the self and self-consciousness as understandable entirely in physical terms; this leads to a biologically constructed self.
Section 2 expands the inquiry from different angles in the cognitive sciences with explorations into concepts of self-representation, self-awareness, and mirror recognition. Advances in brain imaging provide interesting data highlighting a connection between memory and self-consciousness. Panksepp admits that the journey into understanding the neural nature of the self is fraught with peril, and he cautions the reader that "correlational analyses do not reveal causal relationships." p 198 Interestingly, Panksepp adds emotions as an essential element, an area that is often overlooked by many of the disciplines represented. Affective systems, intricately interconnected with other brain processes, are integral to a functional understanding of self-representation and a neurodevelopmental understanding of awareness and motivation to act.
The final section of the book concentrates specifically on schizophrenia symptoms. They are of clinical interest and relevance and remain fixed at a pathological level. The reader begins to appreciate the impact of this serious mental disorder on an individual. With the distance between pathology and normalcy manifest, the relevance to a theory of self becomes obscured.
In the concluding essay, Kircher and David attempt to weave a conceptual model of the self from the various strands of the book. In so doing they hope to provide a framework that might be accessible to further empirical testing. While this multidisciplinary endeavor offers a broad array of problems from differing vantage points, its complexity presents a challenge to the reader. Rather than being a summary of the viewpoints presented, the final synthesis is a particular distillation of them.
This book is an ambitious effort, but are we convinced that the constellation of schizophrenia symptoms can add meaningfully to a discussion of the self? Is the challenge from Berrios and Markova effectively countered? Regardless, this compilation is a captivating read, and one can only hope that it serves as an encouragement to others.
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In the United Kingdom, the atmosphere in which electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) is practised can perhaps best be described as chilly, and the reason for this is described below. The resulting defensive practice of medicine may have the benefit that much time is spent with the patient in obtaining well-informed consent for treatment, but it is generally accepted that this type of practice is not likely to be in the patient's best interest.
The UK National Health Service funds the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), which in 2003 released a "technology appraisal guidance" on ECT 1 (this document and the complete NICE report on the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of ECT are fully accessible at http://www.nice.org.uk). The guidance was very restrictive, and NICE expected that its application would not "increase the use of ECT in England and Wales above current levels," p 19 which had already declined by one-half between 1985 and 1999. The guidance emphasized the negative cognitive consequences of ECT and recommended that ECT be used only to achieve rapid and short-term improvement of severe symptoms after an adequate trial of other treatment options has proven ineffective and/or when the condition is considered to be potentially life-threatening, in individuals with: severe depressive illness; catatonia; or a prolonged or severe manic episode. p 5
Among other potential uses, ECT was specifically not recommended as maintenance therapy for depressive illness. Health practitioners in the United Kingdom are expected to take NICE guidance fully into account when exercising their clinical judgement.
Much of the first chapter of The ECT Handbook is focused on dealing with the NICE guidance and how to deal with clinical practice that is at variance with the guidance. The rest of the book makes repeated references to the lack of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) in specific groups or conditions, and the recommendations for the use of ECT tend to be very conservative. One wonders just what type of RCT would be ethical, for example, in patients with severe depression and intellectual disability (mental retardation)-surely not a sham ECT study.
Some chapters and appendices are strong-for example, those on anesthesia and nursing-but this book also contains information of limited value to the North American reader, unhelpful advice, and even some inaccuracies. For instance, it is recommended that ECT machines be purchased that can deliver stimuli up to 1000 mC, p 145 considerably higher than provided by those routinely available in North America. Given the known association of electrical dose and cognitive side effects, widespread availability and use of such machines is likely to result in greater and unnecessary side effects, especially given the common recommendation (also seen in this book) that right unilateral ECT be given at an electrical dose of at least 200% and up to 500% over seizure threshold. Further, the d'Elia unilateral electrode position is described as a range of temporopariental placements, p 146 whereas in fact d'Elia described a specific electrode position for the nonfrontotemporal stimulating electrode.
2 There is almost no coverage in this book of bifrontal ECT, the use of which is supported by research and which is now widely employed in an effort to minimize cognitive side effects and preserve therapeutic efficacy. Another recommendation of dubious value concerns what are described as "prolonged seizures," which are defined as those lasting in excess of 2 minutes; it is advised that these seizures be terminated immediately by either a further dose of the induction agent or the intravenous administration of a benzodiazepine.
p 227 This recommendation, however, is not supported by adequate evidence.
